Call for papers
Argumentation and (In)Justice
01/10/2025 – 30/04/2026
Paper submissions are invited for the special issue/collection of Topoi entitled: Argumentation and (In)Justice.
Guest Editor(s):
• Michael Baumtrog, Toronto Metropolitan University, baumtrog@torontomu.ca
• Gustavo Arroyo, Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, gjarroyo@yahoo.com.ar
Description:
Argumentation and (in)justice belong prima facie to two distinct philosophical domains—the former to logic and the norms of reason-giving, the latter to ethics and political philosophy. However, there are important and underexplored connections between them that merit closer examination. This special issue of Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy seeks to investigate how practices of argumentation are embedded in, shaped by, and potentially complicit with broader structures of (in)justice. We invite contributions that explore both how injustice can be manifested within argumentative exchanges and how argumentation might be mobilized to resist or redress injustice across various social, political, and epistemic domains.
There are a number of phenomena involving delusive forms of reasoning that are commonly associated with contemporary society. These phenomena have traditionally been studied within epistemology and theories of rationality, but they can also be seen as contributing to social injustice and unjust decision-making. We are referring to cases such as conspiratorial thinking, active ignorance, denialism, the illusion of epistemic autonomy (where individuals without the necessary qualifications defend theories lacking any evidential basis), and tribalism—often amplified by mass media and digital platforms. Representative work in this area includes contributions by Perini-Santos (2020), Lewandowsky et al. (2017), and Ottoni et al. (2018). This work is also closely related to developed and developing work in Virtue Argumentation (Aberdein & Cohen, 2016) and Argumentation Ethics (Stevens 2025; Lumer 2025), which address, among many other things, the character and conduct of arguers.
More specifically, given the epistemic import of argumentation—as a means of sharing knowledge—one fruitful line of inquiry involves its relation to the notion of epistemic injustice, as developed by Fricker (2007). Bondy (2010) offered an initial articulation of this connection through the concept of argumentative injustice, modeled on Fricker’s framework. However, Bondy’s analysis understandably does not address some of the structural dimensions that have become central to discussions of epistemic injustice in the years since Fricker’s influential work. This suggests that the topic remains ripe for further development. The notion of epistemic injustice has also been applied to the field of argumentation through its connection to research on deep disagreement. Lagewaard (2021) has argued that various forms of epistemic injustice can give rise to deep disagreements and hinder the possibility of rational argumentation. This intersection remains a promising and underexplored area for further inquiry.
Finally and most traditionally, is the connection between (in)justice and fallacy theory. Although fallacies have traditionally been studied from the perspective of rationality—as failures to produce well-supported beliefs—they can also be understood as forms of conduct and reasoning that promote (in)justice. This is evident not only in cases such as appeal to ridicule, which can be used to marginalize or silence interlocutors, but also in certain forms of ad hominem fallacies, such as poisoning the well, where the goal is to discredit the methodology or belief framework from which an interlocutor speaks before their arguments are even considered.
See more information HERE.